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Protesting Policy and Practice in South Korea’s Nuclear
Energy Industry
Lauren Richardson introduction by Mel Gurtov
 Introduction: Nuclear Energy in Asia
The Fukushima nuclear disaster of March 2011
has  raised  serious  questions  about  nuclear
power.
The Fukushima disaster of March 11, 2011
In our work since Fukushima, we have tried to
answer  two  questions:  What  is  the  current
status of nuclear energy in Asia? Does nuclear
power have a future in East Asia? By answering
those questions, we hope to contribute to the
global debate about nuclear energy. To be sure,
questions  of  such  magnitude  can  rarely  be
answered with a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Decisions
on energy are made at the national level, on the
basis  of  both  objective  factors  such as  cost-
effectiveness  and  notions  of  the  national
interest,  and  less  objective  ones,  such  as
influence  peddled  by  power  plant  operators,
corruption,  and  bureaucratic  self-interest.
Nevertheless, by closely examining the status
and probable future of nuclear power plants in
specific countries, the authors of this volume
come  up  with  answers,  albeit  mostly  of  a
negative  nature.  At  the  start  of  2017,  450
nuclear  power  reactors  were  operating  in
30 countries, with 60 more under construction
in 15 countries. Thirty-four reactors are under
construction in Asia, including 21 in China. The
“Fukushima effect” has clearly had an impact
in Asia, however. In China, no new construction
took place between 2011 and 2014, although
since then there has been a slow increase of
licenses. Nevertheless, the full story of China’s
embrace  of  nuclear  power,  as  told  in  this
volume by M. V. Ramana and Amy King, is that
the onset of a ‘new normal’ in economic growth
objectives  and  structural  changes  in  the
economy have led to a declining demand for
electricity and the likelihood of far less interest
in nuclear power than had once been predicted.
On the other hand, in South Korea, which relies
on nuclear power for about 31 per cent of its
electricity, Lauren Richardson’s chapter which
is presented here, shows that the Fukushima
disaster and strong civil society opposition have
not deflected official support of nuclear power,
not only for electricity but also for export.
Meanwhile, the 10 countries that comprise the
Association  of  Southeast  Asian  Nations
(ASEAN)  are  divided  about  pursuing  the
nuclear-energy option, with Vietnam deciding
to opt out in 2016, and Cambodia, Indonesia,
Malaysia, and the Philippines at various stages
of  evaluation.  Even so,  the  chapter  by  Mely
Caballero-Anthony and Julius Cesar I. Trajano
shows that only about 1 per cent of ASEAN’s
electricity  will  derive  from nuclear  power  in
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2035, whereas renewables will account for 22
per cent.
How viable nuclear power is finally judged to
be will  depend primarily  on the decisions of
governments,  but  increasingly  also  on  civil
society.  ASEAN has  established  a  normative
framework  that  emphasises  safety,  waste
disposal, and non-proliferation; and civil society
everywhere is increasingly alert to the dangers
and costs, above-board and hidden, of nuclear
power plants. As Doug Koplow’s chapter shows,
for  example,  the  nuclear  industry,  like  fossil
fuels, benefits from many kinds of government
subsidies  that  distort  the  energy  market
against  renewable  energy sources.  Costs  are
politically  as  well  as  environmentally
consequential: even if construction begins on a
nuclear power plant, it will  be cancelled and
construction abandoned in 12 per cent of all
cases. It is important to note that of the 754
reactors constructed since 1951, 90 have been
abandoned and 143 plants  permanently  shut
down.  When  construction  does  proceed,  it
takes between five to 10 years on average for
completion (338 of 609), with some 15 per cent
taking more than 10 years. And, in the end, old
and  abandoned  reactors  will  have  to  be
decommissioned,  as  Kalman  A.  Robertson
discusses, with costs that may double over the
next 15–20 years. As Robertson points out, the
problem of safe disposal of radioactive waste
and the health risk posed by radiation released
during  decommissioning  should  be  factored
into  the  total  price  that  cleanup  crews  and
taxpayers will eventually pay. On top of all that,
there  isn’t  much  experience  worldwide  in
decommissioning.  Then  there  is  the  issue  of
trust  in  those who make decisions.  Tatsujiro
Suzuki’s chapter shows that in Japan, the chief
legacy of Fukushima is public loss of trust in
Japanese  decision-makers  and in  the  nuclear
industry itself. Several years after the accident,
costs continue to mount, a fact that pro-nuclear
advocates  elsewhere  in  Asia  might  want  to
consider. They also need to consider the issue
of  transparency  for,  as  Suzuki  shows,  the
nuclear  industry  has consistently  dodged the
fairly obvious lessons of Fukushima with regard
to  costs,  nuclear  energy’s  future,  and
communication  with  the  public.  Similarly,  in
Taiwan,  as  Gloria  Kuang-Jung  Hsu’s  study
shows,  transparency  about  safety  issues  has
been  notoriously  lacking,  and  a  history  of
efforts to obfuscate nuclear weapon ambitions
means  that  constant  vigilance  over  nuclear
regulators  is  necessary.  Of  course,  if  public
opinion does not  count in  a  country—say,  in
China and Vietnam—the issue of trust is muted.
But  we  know  that,  even  there,  people  are
uneasy about having a nuclear power plant in
their backyard. Issues of hidden cost and public
trust are also embedded in the biological and
health threat posed by nuclear energy. Tilman
A. Ruff, a long-time student of radiation effects
on  human  health,  demonstrates  how  these
effects have been underestimated. He offers a
detailed  explanation  of  what  exposure  to
different doses of radiation, such as from the
Fukushima  accident,  means  for  cancer  rates
and effects on DNA. Timothy A. Mousseau and
Anders P.  Møller,  who have undertaken field
research for many years on the genetic effects
of the Chernobyl accident, look at how nuclear
plant accidents affect the health of humans and
other species.  Combined,  these two chapters
offer  a  potent,  often  overlooked,  argument
against the nuclear option.
This  introduction  by  Mel  Gurtov  and  the
following  article  by  Lauren  Richardson  are
adapted from Peter Van Ness and Mel Gurtov,
eds.,  Learning  From  Fukushima.  Nuclear
Power in East Asia. Australian University Press.
 
Protesting  Policy  and  Practice  in  South
Korea’s Nuclear Energy Industry 
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Japan’s  March  2011  (3/11)  crisis  spurred  a
revival  in  anti-nuclear  activism  around  the
globe.  This  was  certainly  the  case  in  South
Korea,  Japan’s nearest  neighbour,  which was
subject  to  some  of  the  nuclear  fallout  from
Fukushima. This chapter examines the puzzle
of  why  the  South  Korean  anti-nuclear
movement  was  apparently  powerless  in  the
face of its government’s decision to ratchet up
nuclear energy production post-3/11. It argues
that  its  limitations  stem  from  the  highly
insulated  nature  of  energy  policymaking  in
South Korea; the enmeshing of nuclear power
in the government’s ‘Green Growth Strategy’;
and certain tactical  insufficiencies within the
movement  itself.  Notwithstanding  these
limitations,  the  movement  has  successfully
capitalised upon more recent domestic shocks
to the nuclear power industry, resulting in a
slight,  yet significant,  curtailing of the South
Korean government’s nuclear energy capacity
targets.
 
Key words: South Korea, nuclear energy, anti-
nuclear  movment,  US-Korea  all iance,
Fukushima  disaster
 
Introduction
The  March  2011  (3/11)  earthquake  in
northeastern  Japan  and  ensuing  nuclear
meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi plant had
profound reverberations for the global nuclear
industry. In the wake of the disaster, countries
as  far-reaching  as  Germany  and  Switzerland
brought  their  nuclear  energy  programs  to  a
complete  halt.  Closer  to  the  source  of  the
calamity,  the  Taipei  government  initiated  a
gradual phase-out of its nuclear reactors and
suspended  plans  for  the  construction  of  a
fourth nuclear plant. These policy shifts were
precipitated  by  nationwide  anti-nuclear
demonstrations that erupted in response to the
Fukushima  crisis.  Somewhat  surprising,
however, was that Japan’s nearest neighbour,
South Korea, reacted to the complete contrary.
Despite  the  fact  that  Korean  territory  was
subject  to  some  of  the  nuclear  fallout  from
Fukushima (see Hong et al. 2012), the South
Korean government proceeded to ratchet up its
nuclear energy program post-3/11 and pushed
ahead with plans to become a major exporter of
nuclear technology. Indeed, within only months
of Japan’s disaster, South Korean President Lee
Myung-bak reiterated his administration’s goal
of doubling the number of domestic reactors,
and reaffirmed nuclear technology as a primary
export focus. 
This  response was puzzling for  a  number of
reasons.  First,  similarly  to  the  cases  of
Germany, Switzerland, and Taiwan, the South
Korean  anti-nuclear  movement  expanded  to
unprecedented proportions in the aftermath of
Fukushima,  yet  ostensibly  to  no  avail.  This
expansion was driven by a marked decline in
public trust in the safety of nuclear reactors,
and witnessed activists mounting a formidable
challenge to nuclear energy policy. Moreover,
since overthrowing the nation’s long-standing
authoritarian regime in the late 1980s, South
Korean  civil  society  has  evolved  to  wield
powerful  influence across  a  variety  of  policy
domains;  activists,  though,  were  apparently
powerless  in  the  face  of  their  government’s
decision  to  increase  nuclear-generating
capacity.  This  is  somewhat  perplexing  given
that, in the very same year of the Fukushima
calamity,  South  Korean  civic  groups
contributed  to  undercutting  a  proposed
security accord between Seoul and Tokyo, and
‘comfort  women’  victims  compelled  their
foreign ministry to pursue compensation from
Japan more vigorously on their behalf―to name
but two realms of policy influence. 
Why  then  was  South  Korea’s  anti-nuclear
movement unable to subvert the South Korean
government’s nuclear energy policy? Does the
movement’s  lack  of  evident  success  suggest
that it exerted no tangible influence on nuclear
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energy  development  in  South  Korea?  What
factors have served to impede its effectiveness?
This chapter addresses these questions through
an  analysis  of  the  movement’s  campaign  to
alter policy and practice in the South Korean
nuclear energy industry, from the late-1980s to
2016.  As  the  challenges  encountered  by  the
movement  stem  in  part  from  the  structural
development of nuclear energy in South Korea,
the chapter begins by outlining the evolution of
this process. It proceeds to assess the efficacy
of the anti-nuclear movement in pre- and post-
Fukushima contexts, with reference to its aims
and  pressure  tactics.  It  then  assesses  the
reasons  behind  the  government’s  lack  of
responsiveness to the movement, before finally
examining  two  emergent  encumbrances  to
nuclear  energy  policy.
The chapter advances three broad arguments.
First,  the  anti-nuclear  movement  has  had
considerable  success  in  preventing  the
construction  of  nuclear  waste  disposal  sites;
this  endeavour  has  been  more  fruitful  than
strategies  that  sought  to  undermine  the
establishment  of  new  nuclear  power  plants.
Second,  the  movement’s  inability  to  abort
nuclear  energy  production  stems  from  the
highly insulated nature of energy policymaking
in  South  Korea,  the  enmeshing  of  nuclear
power  in  the  government’s  ‘Green  Growth
Strategy’, and certain tactical insufficiencies in
the  ant i -nuc lear  movement .  Th i rd ,
notwithstanding  these  limitations,  the
movement  has  capitalised  upon  recent
domestic shocks to the nuclear power industry,
resulting in  a  curtailing of  the government’s
nuclear energy capacity targets.
 
The  evolution  of  South  Korea’s  nuclear
energy policy
Since its post-Korean War (1950‒53) inception,
energy policy in South Korea has been driven
by the need to spur economic growth, minimise
dependence on imports, and ensure long-term
energy security. In the late 1950s, the South
Korean government opted to develop a nuclear
power  program  as  a  means  to  fuel  the
restoration  of  its  war-shattered  economy.
Officials presumed that nuclear reactors would
provide  a  stable  source  of  energy,  facilitate
export-oriented  growth,  and  reduce  the
nation’s  reliance on costly  oil,  coal,  and gas
imports.  Toward  this  end,  Seoul  joined  the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in
1957, and thereafter enacted Framework Act
No.  483  on  Atomic  Energy  (1958)  and
established an Office of Atomic Energy (1959).
Under  the  iron  grip  of  a  succession  of
authoritarian leaders from the 1960s to the late
1980s,  nuclear  energy  legislation  proceeded
mostly  unhindered  by  public  resistance.
Indeed,  the  Park  Chung-hee  dictatorship
(1961‒79)  was  quick  to  charge  would-be
demonstrators  with  violating  anti-communism
and  national  security  laws,  and  resorted  to
barrages of tear gas and martial law to restrain
them.  It  was  against  this  backdrop  that  the
nation’s first reactor, a small research unit, was
brought to criticality in 1962. Some 10 years
later, the Park government commissioned the
construction of the Kori nuclear power plant in
the  port  city  of  Busan,  and  this  began
generating  in  1978  (Hwang  and  Kim  2013:
196).
In addition to the authoritarian milieu, South
Korea’s  alliance  with  the  United  States
constituted  a  further  driving  force  in  its
development  of  nuclear  energy.  Once  Seoul
embarked  on  its  nuclear  power  program,  a
confluence of  interests emerged between the
American  nuclear  industry,  business
conglomerates (chaebol) and officials in South
Korea. Nuclear power companies in the US had
a specific agenda to promote the advancement
of  nuclear  technology  in  non-communist
countries, and thus viewed South Korea as an
attractive  business  prospect.  In  fact,  the
American firm Combustion Engineering (later
incorporated  into  Westinghouse  Electric)
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supplied  South  Korea  with  its  first  nuclear
reactor  in  1978―the  Kori-1  unit―and
thereupon imparted technological know-how to
the fledgling industry.
The  US  government,  meanwhile,  sought  a
degree of control over its ally’s nuclear energy
policy; this was predicated on dissuading South
Korea from developing an indigenous nuclear
weapons  capability.  Prompted  by  mounting
military  pressure  from  Pyongyang  and  the
withdrawal  of  thousands  of  US  troops  from
South Korea in 1971, Park started harbouring
aspirations  of  nuclear  weapons  development
and  proliferation  (Hayes  and  Moon  2011).
Through the enactment of the Agreement for
Cooperation  between the  Government  of  the
United States of America and the Government
of the Republic of Korea Concerning Civil Uses
of  Atomic  Energy  in  1972,  Washington
attempted to curb these ambitions by pledging
to provide nuclear materials and technology to
Seoul  on  the  condition  that  they  be  used
exclusively  for  energy  production  purposes.
The  terms  of  the  agreement  fur ther
undermined Seoul’s nuclear weapons potential
by prohibiting uranium enrichment and limiting
its fuel cycle options and raw material supply.
When  the  Korea  Atomic  Energy  Research
Institute attempted to circumvent these terms
by  purchasing  reprocessing  plants  from
Belgium  in  the  mid-1970s,  the  US  and
Canadian  governments  thwarted  the  deal  by
exerting financial leverage vis-à-vis Seoul, and
Washington  further  threatened  to  cut  off
support  for  its  ally’s  nuclear  power program
(Hayes  and  Moon  2011:  51‒3).  Under  the
weight  of  this  pressure,  Park  eventually
abandoned  his  weapons  development  and
proliferation  plans  at  the  end  of  the  decade.
Throughout  the  early  to  mid-1980s,  the
expansion  of  South  Korea’s  nuclear  energy
capacity  proceeded  mostly  unencumbered  by
civic  dissent.  This  was  largely  owing  to  the
preoccupation of the populace with achieving
democratisation (Leem 2006). In this context,
the state-owned Korea Electric Power Company
(KEPCO)  oversaw  the  construction  of  an
additional  eight  reactors,  through  the
assistance of American nuclear firms. By the
end  of  the  decade,  South  Korea’s  nuclear
energy industry had evolved to supply 45 per
cent  of  the  nation’s  energy  needs  and  had
virtually  attained  technical  self-reliance.
Nuclear power thus became closely correlated
with South Korea’s rapid industrialisation and
economic rise.
 
The bottom-up movement against nuclear
energy
As the transition to democracy began in the
late-1980s,  however,  the  nuclear  energy
industry began to encounter significant social
resistance.  After  a  decade  of  sustained  civil
uprisings against the authoritarian leadership,
South  Korean  citizens  started  to  question
Park’s  development  model,  in  particular  its
driving  force  of  nuclear  energy.  This
questioning,  which  was  fueled  by  increasing
political liberalisation, gradually gave rise to a
nascent  anti-nuclear  movement.  In  its  early
stages, this movement remained fairly localised
around  nuclear  reactor  sites.  Yet  the
Fukushima  crisis  served  to  galvanise  and
encourage  its  transnational  expansion.
Although the movement’s overarching objective
of  achieving  a  nuclear-free  South  Korea
ultimately  proved abortive,  it  did  succeed in
stymieing  the  construction  of  a  number  of
nuclear  waste  disposal  sites.  This  section
examines  the  movement’s  opposition  tactics
before and after 3/11.
 
Phase 1: Pre-Fukushima
The  South  Korean  anti-nuclear  movement
emerged  as  an  amalgamation  of  various
environmental and other civic-minded groups.
Spurred in part by the numerous nuclear power
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plant-related  accidents  that  had  occurred  by
the end of the 1980s, including the Chernobyl
disaster,  citizens  joined  forces  to  prevent
further  environmental  damage  and  curb  the
nation’s steadily increasing pollution. As a first
step  they  jointly  established  the  National
Headquarters for Nuclear Power Eradication,
and thereupon launched a bottom-up campaign
against nuclear energy.
One of  the first  major  rallying points  of  the
movement was the matter of radioactive waste
disposal. Given that close to 50 per cent of the
nation’s  electricity  was  being  derived  from
nuclear  power  by  the  1980s,  spent  fuel
repositories  were  reaching  capacity  and  the
storage of radioactive waste had begun to pose
a formidable challenge. Activists perceived this
state  of  affairs  as  a  potential  environmental
disaster. When the government first announced
its candidate sites for nuclear waste disposal in
1 9 8 6― a n d  e v e r y  i n s t a n c e
thereafter―impassioned  civic  resistance  thus
followed.  Brandishing  messages  about  the
dangers  of  nuclear  materials,  citizens staged
large-scale protests at government complexes
and  proposed  waste  sites.  These  early
grassroots  efforts  met  with  overwhelming
success: over a period of eight years, the anti-
nuclear movement thwarted the construction of
12 nuclear waste disposal sites (Sayvetz 2012).
In  an  attempt  to  circumvent  further  public
obstruction,  the  South  Korean  government
began targeting remote locales to play host to
waste depositories. In the mid-1990s, officials
designated Gulup Island, a small landmass off
South  Korea’s  western  coast,  as  a  potential
site.  This  plan was  instigated without  public
consultation and when news of it was leaked to
the  public,  anti-nuclear  activists  rallied  in
ange r .  The  Ko rean  Fede ra t i on  f o r
Environmental Movements (KFEM) elected to
head  a  campaign  to  prevent  the  site’s
construction. Boasting a membership of more
than 13,000, the KFEM worked in tandem with
various civic groups to advocate for the Gulup
Island residents, who were strongly averse to
the prospect of a nuclear waste dump in their
residential vicinity (Sayvetz 2012). In a show of
broad-based  consensus  against  the  proposed
site, the KFEM convened mass rallies and filed
an  oppositional  petition  that  attracted
thousands  of  signatures.
When  the  government  belatedly  agreed  to
convene a public  hearing regarding the site,
representatives from a number of civic groups
voiced their concerns about the presence of a
geological  fault  on  the  is land.  Their
apprehensions, however, ostensibly fell on deaf
ears. Public pressure thus continued to mount,
and in the Spring of 1995, over 300 residents in
the  nearby  Deokjeok  Island―who  were  also
f e a r f u l  o f  t h e  s i t e ’ s  p o t e n t i a l
consequences―staged a protest in front of the
Ministry of Science and Technology in Seoul.
Faced  with  this  unrelenting  opposition,
government  officials  were  impelled  to  solicit
experts from the IAEA to conduct a survey on
the proposed site. Their findings revealed the
presence  of  a  fault,  confirming  residents’
suspicions  that  the  site  was  particularly
perilous for the storage of  nuclear waste.  In
light  of  this  development,  the  central
government decided to abort the Gulup Island
plan in November 1995.
The  movement  continued  to  challenge  the
construction  of  radioactive  waste  sites
throughout  the  1990s  and  into  the  early
twenty-first century. These attempts tended to
remain localised in nature and dissipated once
a proposal was successfully undermined.
 
Phase 2: Post-Fukushima
Following the meltdown of the three reactors in
Fukushima,  South  Korea’s  anti-nuclear
movement  underwent  somewhat  of  a
resurgence.  This  was  characterised  by  the
mobilisation of a broader spectrum of activists
and  an  increase  in  the  breadth  of  the
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movement’s anti-nuclear activities.  As images
of the triple meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi
plant  filtered  through  South  Korean  media
outlets,  various  religious  groups,  unions,  co-
ops,  professional  associat ions,  non-
governmental  organisations,  academics,  and
parents groups joined the appeal for a nuclear-
free future. The 3/11 crisis moreover spurred
the South Korean movement to transnationalise
its  anti-nuclear efforts  through joining forces
with like-minded activists  in the region.  This
was instigated by a  group of  Catholic  South
Korean dioceses who pledged to form an East
Asian  civil  society  network  with  anti-nuclear
activists in Japan and China; their objective was
to present a united front of opposition to the
nuclear  power  industry  regardless  of  the
tensions between their respective countries. As
described in their initial prospectus, ‘the more
we  share  information  on  the  dangers  on
nuclear  power  and  spread  technology  and
wisdom  regarding  natural  energy,  the  more
East Asia will become the center of peace, not
conflict;  of  life,  not  destruction’  (East  Coast
Solidarity  for  Anti-Nuke Group 2012).  Under
the nomenclature of the East Coast Solidarity
for Anti-Nuke Group, the group debuted on the
first  anniversary  of  the  Fukushima  disaster
with a  declared membership of  311 citizens,
signifying  that  the  South  Korean  movement
was  no  longer  a  domestic  phenomenon
localised  around  nuclear  waste  sites.
In  accordance  with  the  expansion  of  its
constituents,  the  movement  increased  the
scope of its anti-nuclear efforts in the aftermath
of Fukushima. Moving beyond the initial focus
of  countering the  construction of  new waste
storage  sites  and  plants,  activists  began  to
advocate  more  broadly  for  the  cessation  of
nuclear  energy  production;  accordingly,  they
targeted existing plants. The logic driving the
movement’s  post-Fukushima  campaign  was
essentially  fourfold:  (1)  uranium sources  will
eventually be exhausted, and therefore nuclear
energy  is  not  a  viable  permanent  energy
source;  (2)  most  of  the  developed  countries
around the world are no longer constructing
new nuclear  reactors  and,  since  Fukushima,
are seriously  rethinking their  nuclear energy
policies; (3) when factoring in the social costs,
nuclear  energy  cannot  be  considered  cost-
effective; and (4) as the mining and processing
of uranium produces carbon dioxide emissions,
nuclear power cannot be conceived of  as an
environmentally  friendly  source.  Meanwhile,
the overarching logic informing the movement
was that Japan’s ‘March 11 disaster has proven
that nuclear power plants are not safe’ (Nagata
2012).
First  among  the  anti-nuclear  movement’s
post-3/11 objectives was to nullify the lifespan
extensions of  the nation’s two oldest nuclear
reactors―Kori-1  and  Wolsong-1.  The  former
unit,  which  was  already  running  beyond  its
technological  lifespan,  had  experienced  a
number of technical problems in the Spring of
2011, and was consequently temporarily shut
down.  Yet  shortly  thereafter  nuclear  officials
declared it suitable for operation and allowed it
to  resume  power  generation.  Likewise,  the
latter unit, which began operating in 1983 at a
plant in North Gyeongsang province, was taken
offline for extended maintenance in June 2009.
As its operating license was due to expire in
2012, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP)
spent ₩560 billion (US$509 million) on refitting
the  unit  with  the  hope  of  prolonging  its
lifespan. Ultimately, the reactor was cleared for
restart in June 2011.
These  decisions  by  nuclear  energy  officials
were  made  in  close  succession  to  the
Fukushima  disaster,  and  thus  aroused  fears
among local residents of a similar catastrophe
occurring  in  their  own  vicinity.  Under  the
banner of a group called Collective Action for a
Nuclear Free Society, residents demanded that
the life extensions of the reactors be nullified.
Toward this end, they staged protests in front
of the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission
(NSSC) in Seoul, where officials deliberated the
fate of the reactors, and chanted anti-nuclear
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slogans. In spite of these objections, however,
nuclear  officials  permitted  Kori-1’s  continued
operation.  And although they agreed to  shut
down  Wolsong-1  at  the  conclusion  of  its
lifespan  in  November  2012,  they  later
backtracked,  granting  permission  for  it  to
restart  in  February  2015  and  operate  for  a
further  10  years.  These  two  decisions
constituted a major setback for the movement.
In addition to focusing on aged reactors, the
anti-nuclear movement continued on its mission
to abort the construction of new nuclear power
plants. Activists concentrated on the candidate
sites of Samcheok and Yeongdeok, two cities on
the  east  coast  of  South  Korea  in  which  the
government  proposed  to  build  eight  new
reactors  (four  at  each  site).  The  local
government of Samcheok had originally agreed
to  host  a  nuclear  power  plant  in  2010.  Yet
following the Fukushima disaster, anti-nuclear
sentiment  swept  throughout  the  city,
culminating in the formation of the Pan-Citizen
Alliance for Cancelling the Samcheok Nuclear
Power Plant. To signal their changed stance on
nuclear power to the central government, the
city residents elected a new mayor, Kim Yang-
ho,  who  had  campaigned  on  an  anti-nuclear
platform.  In  order  to  elicit  a  collective  anti-
nuclear expression, Kim held a referendum in
October 2014. As he anticipated, the majority
of  citizens  indicated  their  opposition  to  the
plant’s construction: among the 69.8 per cent
of the voting population who participated in the
referendum,  85  per  cent  voted  against  the
proposed  site.  Due  to  the  fact  that  the
referendum  was  not  legally  sanctioned,
however, the national government declared it
non-binding and thus ignored the result.
In the second candidate city of Yeongdeok, a
similar outcome transpired. Being a rural and
coastal county with a dwindling population and
struggling economy, Yeongdeok residents had
initially been enthused about the prospect of
economic  revitalisation  that  a  nuclear  power
plant would offer. Not only would it bring much
needed  employment  opportunities,  but  the
South  Korean  government  had  pledged  to
provide ₩1.5 trillion (US$1.35 billion),  over a
60-year period, to compensate for any potential
associated  dangers.  Having  lost  their  earlier
(2005) bid to host a storage site for low-level
radioactive  waste,  the  citizens  of  Yeongdeok
were particularly keen to secure the nuclear
power plant venture. Their enthusiasm quickly
dissipated, however, in the face of Japan’s 3/11
disaster. Indeed, residents had not foreseen the
possibility of tsunami damage to the plant when
originally  submitting  their  host  bid.  In  the
aftermath  of  Fukushima,  local  citizens  thus
called for a county referendum to overturn the
plan. In this instance, the mayor was unwilling
to support the initiative and therefore residents
organised  it  on  their  own  accord.  Perhaps
owing  to  this  lack  of  official  backing,  the
referendum failed to attract the requisite one-
third of voters for it to hold legal sway (Kim
2015). In any case, national officials dismissed
both  the  Samcheok  and  Yeongdeok  voter
outcomes  on  the  grounds  that  central
government  projects  are  not  subject  to  local
referenda results.
Evidently,  the  pressure  tactics  of  the  South
Korean anti-nuclear movement have produced
mixed results. Early protests were successful in
undermining nuclear waste site proposals and
plans for the construction of a small number of
nuclear  power  plants.  Yet  in  the  post-
Fukushima period, the movement largely failed
in its aims to abrogate the lifespan extensions
of  aged  reactors  and  reverse  site  selection
decisions for new nuclear power plants.
 
Explaining the limited policy change
Despite the magnitude of the Fukushima crisis
and  ensuing  tide  of  pressure  from the  anti-
nuclear  movement,  Seoul’s  nuclear  power
pol icy  showed  no  immediate  s igns  of
deceleration―at  least  on  the  surface.  The
disaster  only  prompted  limited  government
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measures  aimed  at  counteracting  potential
contamination  from  Japan’s  meltdown,  and
enhancing  the  safety  of  domestic  nuclear
installations. In the two months following 3/11,
all 30,000 passengers that entered South Korea
from Japan (by ship or aircraft) were screened
for  radioactivity;  only  two  people,  however,
required decontamination (Korean Government
2011). Over the same two months, the central
government ordered nuclear officials to carry
out a special  safety inspection of  all  nuclear
power  plants  throughout  the  country,  yet
ultimately  no  abnormalities  were  detected.
Finally,  in  June  2011,  the  South  Korean
National Assembly passed a bill to establish the
Nuclear  Safety  and  Security  Commission,  a
regulatory body tasked with protecting public
health and safety.
Together these measures constituted the extent
o f  the  Sou th  Korean  government ’ s
responsiveness  to  3/11  and  the  subsequent
pressure  from  the  anti-nuclear  movement.
South Korea continues  to  stand as  the  sixth
largest  consumer  of  nuclear  energy  in  the
world,  second  in  Asia  only  to  Japan.  There
remain  24  nuclear  reactors  operating
nat ionwide,  with  another  f ive  under
construction. Government officials continue to
emphasise the safety and low-cost efficiency of
nuclear  power,  while  largely  eschewing  the
development  of  renewable  energy  sources.
Expanding the nuclear energy industry is still a
national strategic priority, as exemplified in the
Ministry  of  Science  and  Technology’s  (2006)
Third Comprehensive Plan for Nuclear Energy
Development  (2007‒11).  The  government
predicted in this report that the nation would
derive  59  per  cent  of  its  electricity  from
nuclear power sources by 2030.
In  addition  to  these  domestic  ambitions,
nuclear  energy  technology  has  evolved  to
become  a  major  export  industry  for  South
Korea.  The  Ministry  of  Knowledge  Economy
intends to export another 80 reactors, worth a
total  of  US$400 billion,  by 2030.  The nation
secured its first major international contract in
2009, when KEPCO signed a US$40 billion deal
to  construct  four  nuclear  reactors  for  the
United  Arab  Emirates  (UAE).  Undeterred  by
the  Fukushima  meltdown,  President  Lee
embarked on an official visit to the UAE on 13
March  2011―a mere  two  days  after  Japan’s
crisis began to unfold―to reaffirm his plans for
future  energy  cooperation.  Besides  the  UAE
deal,  Seoul  has  secured  a  US$173  million
contract to build a nuclear research reactor in
Jordan,  and  to  construct  several  reactors  in
Saudi  Arabia  worth  a  total  of  US$2  billion.
Other target export countries for South Korea’s
nuclear  industry  include  China,  Finland,
Hungary,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Turkey,  and
Vietnam.
What  explains  the failure  of  the  anti-nuclear
movement  to  subvert  the  development  of
nuclear  energy  in  South  Korea?  Pressure
tactics cannot singularly account for the limited
policy change. Rather, a combination of three
factors  have  served  to  militate  against
substantial  nuclear  power  reform.  These
include (1) the highly insulated and top-down
nature of nuclear energy policymaking in South
Korea;  this  has  restricted  the  number  of
legislative handles around which activists can
mobilise to influence policy decisions; (2) the
centrality  of  nuclear  energy  to  the  South
Korean government’s Green Growth Strategy, a
factor  that  has  legitimated  its  continued
expansion;  and (3)  shortcomings  in  the  anti-
nuclear  movement’s  pressure  strategy,
specifically, its laxness in articulating a feasible
alternative energy strategy to nuclear power.
 
The  insu lar i t y  o f  nuc lear  power
policymaking
The primary hurdle faced by the movement has
been the elite-driven nature of policymaking on
nuclear energy. In contrast to the many other
policy domains in South Korea which allow for
substantial  input  from  citizens,  decisions  on
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nuclear  energy  continue  to  be  formulated
exclusively  by  government  officials  and
technocrats, in a highly insulated environment.
The key actors engaged in this process include
the  Ministry  of  Commerce,  Industry  and
Energy;  the  Ministry  of  Trade,  Industry  and
Energy;  the  Ministry  of  Science,  ICT  and
Future  Planning;  the  NSSC;  and  various
chaebol and bureaucratic authorities. Each of
these institutions is in turn informed by pro-
nuclear politicians and technocrats, producing
an  iron  triangle  of  decision-making  that
excludes civil society. This triangular structure
was particularly reinforced with the installation
of  Lee―a  former  chaebol  leader  (Hyundai
executive)―as South Korean president in 2008.
As  a  corollary  of  this  elite-driven  process,
nuclear energy policy is implemented through a
top-down dynamic. This has been characterised
by  a  ‘decide-announce-defend’  sequence
(Norman and Nagtzaam 2016: 250),  whereby
the  central  government  enacts  a  policy,
proceeds to impose it on local government and
citizens,  and  then  seeks  to  placate  any
objections  by  offering  financial  rewards  and
other  incentives.  This  sequence  was  vividly
evinced  in  the  Gulup  Island  fiasco.  As  this
strategy,  though,  has  proved  abortive  on  a
number  of  occasions,  the  government  has
attempted since 2004 to move toward a slightly
more consultative mechanism that incorporates
citizens’  preferences.  Activists  continue,
however, to face significant barriers in shaping
the  nuclear  energy  agenda.  The  elite-driven
and top-down dynamic of the policy process has
in fact steered their pressure tactics away from
government lobbying, toward the more viable
strategy of obstructing policy implementation.
 
Nuclear power as ‘green’ energy
A further  inhibiting factor  for  the movement
has been the enmeshing of nuclear power in
the South Korean government’s Green Growth
Strategy.  Essentially,  this  has  added another
layer of insularity to nuclear energy policy in
South Korea.
As  a  consequence  of  South  Korea’s  rapid
industrialisation over the last few decades, its
greenhouse  gas  emissions  virtually  doubled
between  1990  and  2005―an  increment
exceeding most of the OECD (Organisation for
Economic  Co-operation  and  Development)
countries.  At  the  same  time,  Seoul’s  annual
mean  temperature  increased  by  1.5  degrees
Celsius,  surpassing the global average of 0.7
degrees  Celsius  (von  Hippel,  Yun,  and  Cho
2011).  These  developments,  coupled  with  an
emergent international consensus on the need
to address  climate  change,  forced the South
Korean government to consider ways to curtail
its carbon dioxide emissions. Being at once low-
carbon and cost-effective, nuclear energy was
seized  upon  by  South  Korean  officials  as  a
convenient  so lut ion  to  the  nat ion ’s
environmental and climate woes, and also as a
means to deal with rising energy demands. In
2009,  the  Lee  administration  announced  a
national  Green Growth Strategy premised on
three major objectives: reducing fossil fuel use,
tracking  greenhouse  gas  emissions,  and
establishing several new nuclear power plants.
Renewable  energy  was  relegated  only  a
marginal  status  under  the  plan.
This linking of nuclear power to the national
environmental  and  climate  strategy  was
institutionalised through the government’s Five
Year Plan for Green Growth (2009‒13), and the
Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth
(2010). As a result of this process, the political
opportunity  structure  surrounding  nuclear
energy became less favourable to activists. The
discursive framing of nuclear power as both a
means to reduce carbon emissions and promote
energy  independence,  enabled  the  South
Korean government to legitimise its  plans to
expand nuclear power domestically and export
nuclear  technology  abroad.  Indeed,  Lee
boasted to his constituencies that the planned
export  of  four  reactors  to  the  UAE  would
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equate to ‘40 million tons of carbon mitigation’
(Lee 2010: 11‒12).
To challenge this stance of the government, the
anti-nuclear  movement  has  attempted  to
counter - f rame  nuc lear  power  as  an
environmentally  unfriendly  energy source.  As
previously  mentioned,  activists  have  argued
that  the  mining  and  processing  of  uranium
produces  carbon  dioxide  emissions.  The
movement  has  furthermore  underscored  the
clause of the South Korea‒US atomic energy
agreement that  prohibits  the reprocessing of
spent fuel,  and thus renders the necessity of
environmentally  hazardous  radioactive  waste
sites. As many of South Korea’s nuclear power
plants  are  located  in  coastal  areas  that  are
subject  to  occasional  earthquakes,  activists
have  also  raised  the  possibil ity  of  the
occurrence of a Fukushima-style disaster. This
counter-frame, however, has yet to tip the cost-
benefit analysis of nuclear energy by the wider
populace. Indeed, there remains an overriding
belief within South Korean society that nuclear
power  holds  the  key  to  combating  climate
change, as argued by the government.
 
Tactical insufficiencies in the anti-nuclear
movement
The limited  policy  change  in  nuclear  energy
development  can  further  be  attributed  to
insufficiencies in the tactics of the anti-nuclear
movement. Throughout their campaign against
nuclear  power,  activists  have  neglected  to
formulate a feasible alternative energy source.
Instead of demanding new policies (Hermanns
2015:  276),  they  have  tended  towards  the
reactionary  tactics  of  undercutting  policy
implementation and emphasising the hazards
inherent in nuclear energy. In view of the fact
that South Korea is lacking in natural resources
and  its  economy  is  structured  around
manufacturing, this approach of the movement
has  been  problematic  for  the  offsetting  of
nuclear  power.  In  the  absence of  a  strategy
delineating  how  the  nation’s  energy  needs
might otherwise be met―accounting both for
energy  security  issues  and  projected
industrialisation―it  is  improbable  that  the
South  Korean  government  would  eschew
nuclear  power  as  a  major  energy  source.
Formulating  such  a  strategy  is  all  the  more
necessary  in  light  of  the  nation’s  dense
population,  relatively  small  landmass,  and
mountainous  terrain,  all  of  which  render
certain  forms  of  renewable  energy―such  as
wind  farms―less  conceivable  than  in  other
countries.
And  while  the  anti-nuclear  movement  has
significantly  increased  in  scope  since
Fukushima,  its  pressure  tactics  have  not
resulted in a marked change in public opinion
vis-à-vis  nuclear  power.  According  to  annual
polls conducted by the Korea Nuclear Energy
Agency,  South  Korean  citizens  have  upheld
consistent  views  about  the  importance  of
nuclear-generated  energy  throughout  recent
years, with national support for nuclear power
plants hovering between 80 per cent and 90
per  cent―even  after  Fukushima.  This  has
served  to  further  bolster  the  government’s
mandate to expand its nuclear energy program.
The  3/11  disaster  did,  however,  result  in
lowered  perceptions  regarding  the  safety  of
nuclear  reactors  and  radioactive  waste
management in South Korea, with 39 per cent
and  24  per  cent  of  survey  respondents
expressing their confidence in these respective
realms. Additionally, polls conducted one year
prior  to  and  one  year  after  Fukushima
indicated a decline of 8 per cent (from 28 per
cent  to  20  per  cent)  in  local  acceptance  of
nuclear power (Dalton and Cha 2016). These
statistics  reflect  the  fact  that  opposition  to
nuclear  power  is  highly  localised  to  rural
areas―where nuclear power plants and waste
sites  are  concentrated―while  support  for
nuclear power rests with the larger cities, such
as Seoul, where the power-brokers reside and
nuclear power plants are a rare sight.
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In effect, the downturn in local approval of and
confidence in the safety of nuclear reactors has
complicated the policy implementation process
in South Korea. At the same time, though, the
sustained  broad-based  support  for  nuclear
power generation has functioned to attenuate
the  pressure  tactics  of  the  anti-nuclear
movement.
 
New challenges to South Korea’s nuclear
energy industry
Notwithstanding  the  limitations  of  the  anti-
nuclear movement in shaping energy policy in
South  Korea,  recent  years  have  seen  the
emergence  of  two  new  challenges  to  the
government’s  nuclear  power  strategy.
Mani fest ing  both  endogenously  and
exogenously,  effectively  these  have  sent
shockwaves  throughout  the  industry,  forcing
Seoul to curb its generating capacity ambitions.
For  its  part,  the  anti-nuclear  movement  has
seized upon these shocks as opportunities to
whip up further opposition to nuclear energy
among South Korea’s populace.
 
Corruption scandals
The first of these challenges manifested as a
series  of  corruption  scandals  implicating
nuclear officials, and a consequent erosion of
public  trust  in  nuclear energy regulation.  As
part  of  Seoul’s  bid  to  expand  its  nuclear-
generating capacity, 11 new reactors had been
planned  for  construction  in  the  period
2012‒21. This proposal was derailed, however,
when  i t  was  found—during  a  rout ine
inspection—that  the  plant  manager  had
covered-up  a  reactor  power  failure  (KHNP
2012). When the reactor in question had lost
power, the emergency diesel generator failed
to start, signalling a host of potential dangers.
The  plant  manager  refrained  from reporting
the mishap due to a fear of inciting a public
backlash and ‘worsening the plant’s credibility’
(IAEA‒NSNI 2012: 3).
Given Kori’s location in South Korea’s second
most populous city of Busan, this act of cover-
up  provided  ample  opportunity  for  the  anti-
nuclear  movement  to  stoke  public  concerns
about  regulatory  practices.  Thus,  amidst  the
controversy,  the  KFEM  and  the  No  Nukes
Busan  Citizen  Countermeasure  Commission
simulated a radioactive leak (on the scale of the
Chernobyl disaster) at the plant, to determine
the  probable  effects.  The  results  were
published in a report, and predicted that such
an  accident  would  produce  roughly  900,000
casualties in Busan, and ₩628 trillion (US$533
billion)  worth  of  property  damage (Yi  2012).
This  scenario,  which  was  reminiscent  of  the
safety  regulatory  failure  at  the  Fukushima
Daiichi  plant,  struck  widespread  fear  in  the
minds of  residents.  While a panel  of  experts
from the IAEA proceeded to declare the two
reactors as safe, their assurances failed to allay
the concerns of local citizens who were quickly
losing trust in nuclear officials (IAEA 2012).
On  the  heels  of  this  incident  a  second
corruption  scandal  occurred,  further
highlighting  the  lack  of  transparency  in  the
regulation  of  nuclear  power  plants  in  South
Korea.  This  unravelled  in  November  2012,
when regulators discovered that at least 5,000
small reactor components at the Yeonggwang
nuclear power plant lacked proper certification,
and that at least 60 of the quality assurance
certificates  for  these  components  were  fake.
After  launching  an  official  investigation,  the
KHNP announced that between 2003 and 2012,
the  plant  had  been  supplied  with  a  total  of
7,682  items  with  forged  quality  certificates
(LaForge  2013‒14).  In  l ight  of  these
revelations, the KHNP was compelled to shut
down two of the plant’s six reactors until the
dubious reactor components were replaced. As
citizen protests erupted over the controversy,
nuclear authorities were prompted to inspect
the components of all 23 reactors nationwide.
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This  led  to  the  discovery  of  copious  forged
safety certificates for reactor parts at the Kori
and Wolseong plants. Consequently, the Kori-2
and Shin Wolseong-1 units were shut down in
June  2013,  and  Kori-1  and  Shin  Wolseong-2
were  ordered  to  remain  offline  while  the
unauthorised  parts  were  refitted.  In  the
ascription of culpability for these scandals, 100
people  were  indicted  on  bribery  charges,
including a former chief executive of the KHNP
and  a  vice-president  of  KEPCO  (LaForge
2013‒14).
Once again these events triggered an upsurge
in anti-nuclear ferment in South Korea. Citizens
attributed  the  corrupt  practices  in  safety
certification to the culture of secrecy shrouding
the nuclear energy industry. These sentiments
were  evinced  in  protests  that  erupted  in
response to the shut down of the Yeonggwang
reactors,  which  attracted  as  many  as  2,500
citizens. Calling for an overall safety review of
South  Korea’s  nuclear  power  plants,
participants burned effigies of the KHNP and
brandished placards claiming, ‘We feel uneasy!’
To  placate  the  public  outcry,  Cho  Seok,  the
chief executive officer of the KHNP, issued a
public apology in September 2013 conceding
that  the  corruption  scandals  constituted  the
‘utmost crisis’ ever faced by the nuclear sector,
and vowed to reform South Korea’s corporate
culture.
Together these controversies engendered a loss
of  overall  public  trust  in  the  government’s
capacity to regulate nuclear energy production.
This outcome was inevitably reinforced by the
parallels  that  citizens  drew  between  the
regulatory shortcomings at Fukushima Daiichi
and that of their national nuclear power plants.
 
Cyber-attacks on nuclear power plants
The  second  formidable  challenge  to  South
Korea’s  nuclear  energy  program emerged  in
the form of  a  cyber-attack.  This  occurred in
December  2014  when  a  hacker  leaked  the
partial  blueprints  and  operating  manuals  for
three domestic nuclear reactors, in addition to
the personal data on 10,000 KHNP employees
(Baylon,  Livingstone,  and  Brunt  2015).  The
material was first published online via a blog,
and then on a Twitter account under the profile
‘president  of  the anti-nuclear  reactor  group’.
The hacker, whose identity was unknown (the
South  Korean  government  suspected
Pyongyang), issued a threat to the effect that
unless  three  specific  reactor  units―Kori-1,
Kori-3,  and  Wolseong-2―were  shut  down  by
Christmas,  they  would  systematically  be
destroyed and further data would be published
online. ‘Will you take responsibility when these
blueprints, installation diagrams and programs
are released to the countries that want them?’
the  hacker  threatened  in  Korean.  The  three
nuclear  reactors  at  the  centre  of  the
controversy had long been targeted by the anti-
nuclear movement, given their close proximity
to populous areas.
Despite  having  accessed  the  reactors’
blueprints and manuals,  however,  the hacker
was  unable  to  obtain  critical  technical  data
pertaining to the nuclear facilities; indeed, this
information  is  stored  securely  within  the
KHNP’s  control  monitoring  system,  which  is
separate from its internal network. The attacks
nevertheless prompted the government to raise
its  cyber-crisis  alert  level  to  ‘attention’―the
second on a five-step scale―and to run a series
of  cyber-warfare drills  on its  various nuclear
power plants. More worrisome for government
and nuclear officials was that the cyber-attack
and its attendant threats provided further fuel
for  the  anti-nuclear  movement  and  stirred
greater social  unrest  among residents in the
Kori and Wolseong plant vicinities. In the eyes
of  local  citizens,  the  susceptibility  of  the
KHNP’s  internal  server  to  cyber-attacks
constituted yet  another  danger  associated to
nuc lea r  energy  p roduc t i on .  These
apprehensions were buttressed by the hacker’s
pronouncement that anyone living in proximity
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to  the  plants  should  vacate  their  homes
immediately (McCurry 2014).
What  was  the  combined  impact  of  these
challenges  on  South  Korea’s  nuclear  energy
program?  In  short,  the  rise  in  anti-nuclear
sentiment in relation to the scandals essentially
reined  in  the  government’s  nuclear  power
aspirations.  Faced  with  unprecedented
criticism  over  the  safety  standards  and
regulatory practices at domestic nuclear power
plants,  South  Korea’s  Ministry  of  Trade,
Industry,  and  Energy  was  compelled  to
drastically  lower the national  nuclear  energy
capacity target. Whereas the initial goal was to
attain  59  per  cent  capacity  by  2030,  in  the
aftermath of the scandals, this was reduced to
a  more  modest  22‒29  per  cent  (by  2035)
(Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy 2014:
40). The justification provided for this revision
was the need to avoid ‘excessive expansion’ of
nuclear energy, and doubtlessly was premised
on the  increasing  concerns  of  citizens.  As  a
further  ramification,  the  KHNP  agreed  to
permanently shut down the Kori-1 reactor in
June  2017  on  the  advice  of  the  central
government,  rendering  it  the  first  of  South
Korea’s  nuclear  power  units  to  enter  the
decommissioning  phase.  The  controversies
moreover  necessarily  imposed  a  significant
financial burden on the KHNP: a congressional
hearing in October 2013 estimated this cost to
be as high as US$2.8 billion (Cho 2013).
The overarching effect of the scandals is that
South  Korea’s  nuclear  energy  industry  has
been rendered more accountable to the public.
This  status  quo  is  being  reinforced  by  the
recent corruption charges levelled against the
Park  Geun-hye  administration,  and  the
consequent  presidential  impeachment
proceedings.  As  allegations  emerged  that
President  Park―daughter  of  Park  Chung-
hee―had  colluded  with  a  confidante  in  the
embezzlement of  large sums of  public funds,
over a million South Korean citizens took to the
streets in protest. Their refusal to accept their
president’s apology and to continue to call for
her resignation, is stark evidence of society’s
diminished  tolerance  for  government
malfeasance.
 
Conclusion: The post-Fukushima legacy of
the South Korean anti-nuclear movement
The Fukushima disaster of March 2011 was a
vivid reminder for the world that nuclear power
plants  can  cause  catastrophic  damage.  A
number of governments accordingly aborted or
considerably slowed the pace of their nuclear
energy  programs,  taking  heed  of  rising
concerns about the safety of nuclear reactors
among their populaces. Yet, as we have seen,
South Korea conversely pushed ahead with its
ambition  to  become  a  foremost  nuclear
powerhouse after 3/11. This was in spite of the
anti-nuclear  movement  gaining  significant
traction  and  mounting  a  concerted  effort  to
alter policy and practice in the industry. The
aim of  this  chapter  has  been to  explain  the
limited  effect  of  the  movement  through  an
examination  of  its  anti-nuclear  campaigns  in
pre- and post-Fukushima contexts.
It  found that,  owing to the fact that nuclear
power  became  firmly  ensconced  in  Seoul’s
energy policy long before the advent of anti-
nuclear  activism,  the  movement  faced
formidable  structural  obstacles  from  its
incipient stages. This entrenchment of nuclear
energy occurred as a consequence of decades-
long  dictatorial  rule,  the  US‒South  Korea
alliance, and the export-oriented development
model  installed  by  former  President  Park
Chung-hee. Early collaboration among activists
on  opposing  nuclear  energy  was  hampered
primarily  by  two  factors:  the  dictates  of
authoritarian leadership and the preoccupation
of the South Korean citizenry with achieving
democratisation.
Once  the  anti-nuclear  movement  eventually
materialised in the late-1980s, it proceeded to
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challenge  various  facets  of  nuclear  energy
policy with mixed results. In the earlier stages
of its campaign, activists attained a degree of
success in thwarting the construction of new
nuclear  power  plants  and  radioactive  waste
disposals. They largely failed, though, in their
post-Fukushima  objectives  of  countering  the
lifespan  extension  of  reactors  due  for
decommissioning, and overturning county-level
agreements  (enacted  pre-3/11)  to  host  new
nuclear power plants.
This  limited  policy  change,  it  was  argued,
cannot  solely  be  understood  in  terms  of
deficiencies  within  the  movement.  Rather,  a
combination of factors have served to constrain
the  opportunity  structure  for  activists,
including the insulated and top-down nature of
nuclear energy policymaking in South Korea,
and  the  integrality  of  nuclear  power  to  the
government’s Green Growth Strategy. For its
part, the movement has neglected to formulate
a viable alternative to nuclear energy, which
has  long  constituted  a  driving  force  of
economic  growth  for  the  nation.
While  the  anti-nuclear  movement  failed  to
achieve a phase-out of nuclear power in South
Korea, it would be imprecise to conclude that
its  efforts  have  been  ineffectual.  In  fact,
activists have succeeded in politicising nuclear
energy and weakening its public support base.
This  process  was  facilitated  by  the  recent
revelations  of  endemic  corruption  within  the
industry (and government writ large), as well
as  the  cyber-attacks  targeting  the  more
notorious nuclear reactors in the country. The
movement capitalised upon these scandals to
mobilise further anti-nuclear sentiment, and to
fuel public mistrust in the regulation of nuclear
energy.  As  a  result,  the  South  Korean
government’s  policy  of  expanding  nuclear
energy is now subject to an increasingly hostile
domestic  atmosphere,  which  stands  in  sharp
contrast  to  the  earlier  authoritarian  era.
Furthermore,  the  movement  partially  eroded
the  government’s  monopoly  over  nuclear
energy, by compelling the industry to enhance
its transparency, improve the safety of existing
reactors,  and  to  conform  to  greater  public
scrutiny.  But  perhaps  the  most  significant
legacy  of  the  movement  thus  far,  is  that  it
helped to  persuade the  government  to  scale
back its target for nuclear power generation by
as much as 30 per cent.
Nevertheless, South Korea remains on track to
cement  i ts  status  as  a  nuclear  power
stronghold. In order to change this status quo,
the anti-nuclear movement will  need to exert
constant  pressure,  citing  the  lessons  of
Fukushima,  and  to  formulate  a  feasible
alternative to nuclear energy. This in turn will
help the South Korean government to resolve
its dilemma of being reliant on nuclear reactors
to sustain economic growth and reduce carbon
dioxide emissions, on the one hand, and subject
to rising anti-nuclear views from its electorate,
on the other.
If  Seoul  continues  to  pursue  the  further
development  of  nuclear  power  without
establishing  a  consultative  mechanism  that
adequately  incorporates  the  views  of  South
Korean  citizens,  effectively  it  will  only  add
greater fuel to the anti-nuclear movement. As
surmised by Yeon Hyeong-cheol of the KFEM:
Nuclear power plants are directly connected to
the lives of the residents, yet the government
has ignored citizens’ opinions and insisted on a
policy  in  favour  of  expanding nuclear  power
plants. Now that we have confirmed the [anti-
nuclear]  thoughts  of  the  citizens,  we  will
actively engage in movements to close down
old  nuclear  power  plants  and to  oppose  the
construction  of  new  nuclear  power  plants
nationwide (Choi 2014).
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